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Consider an agent who must choose an action today under uncertainty about the con-
sequence of any chosen action but without having in mind a complete list of all the
contingencies that could inﬂuence outcomes. She conceives of some relevant contin-
gencies or states of the world but she is aware that these contingencies are coarse—they
leave out some details that may affect outcomes. Though she may not be able to de-
scribe these ﬁner details, she is aware that they exist and this may affect her behavior.
How does one model such an agent?
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The reason for addressing this question seems clear. Outside of artiﬁcial laboratory-
style settings, it would seem impossible for any decision-maker to identify all relevant
and ﬁnely detailed contingencies. A sophisticated agent would be aware of her limited
foresight and admit the possibility that her conceptualization of the future is incom-
plete, and then she would take this into account in her decision-making. Think, for ex-
ample, of a portfolio choice setting. An investor may identify some factors that are likely
to inﬂuence returns to ﬁnancial securities. However, few sophisticated investors would
be conﬁdent that they have identiﬁed all relevant factors. Awareness that her concep-
tualization is missing some details would presumably inﬂuence an investor’s choice of
portfolio.
The standard Savage approach to modeling uncertainty, using a primitive state
space, does not capture the agents we have in mind. It is inappropriate for two reasons.
First, each Savage-style state is a complete description of the world—it determines a
unique outcome forany chosen action. Second, even if weknew how to modela “coarse
or incomplete state” and we redeﬁned the Savage state space accordingly, the resulting
approach would still be unsatisfactory if, as in Savage, the state space were adopted as
a primitive and thus presumed observable by the modeler. Ideally, the agent’s concep-
tualization of the future should be taken to be subjective—it should be derived from
preference, that is, from behavior that in principle is observable.
Kreps (1979, 1992) was the ﬁrst to raise the modeling problem posed above. He,
andalsosubsequentauthors, referto“unforeseencontingencies,” butitseemsthatthey
have inmind whatwe preferto call“coarse contingencies.” Kreps’seminal ideawas that
demand for ﬂexibility is indicative of an individual’s awareness of the coarseness of her
conception. In order to capture demand for ﬂexibility, his model postulates preference
over menus of alternatives (or ex post actions), where the latter are to be chosen at an
unmodeled ex post stage. The subjective state space that he derives may be identiﬁed
with the possible future preferences over alternatives.
Nehring (1999) and Dekel et al. (2001) provide alternative extensions. In the models
of Kreps and Nehring, menus consist of alternatives from an abstract (typically ﬁnite)
set. We focus primarily on the model of Dekel et al. (henceforth DLR), where menus
consist of lotteries over alternatives. The richer domain permits, given suitable assump-
tions, the derivation of a (unique) subjective state space as part of the representation of
preference. But are these states coarse? DLR describe (p. 893) the agent they view them-
selves as modeling: “... she sees some relevant considerations, but knows there may be
others that she cannot specify. For simplicity, we assume henceforth that the agent con-
ceives ofonly one situation, ‘somethinghappens,’ but knows thather conceptualization
is incomplete.” Later (pp. 919–20), they describe what is needed for a critique of their
model: “... just as Ellsberg identiﬁed the role of the sure-thing principle in precluding
uncertainty-averse behavior, we believe that one must ﬁrst ﬁnd a concrete example of
behavior that is a sensible response to unforeseen contingencies but that is precluded
by our axioms. An important direction for further research is to see if there is such an
Ellsbergian example for this setting and, if so, to explore relaxations of our axioms.” This
is the direction we pursue here.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 357
Our central argument is that an agent who is aware of, and averse to, the coarseness
of her conceptualization of the future will have an incentive to randomize, and thus will
violate Independence. As an example, suppose that her subjective conceptualization is
trivial—“something happens.” Suppose further that she is indifferent between commit-
ting ex ante to lottery  or to lottery 0. She is aware ex ante that there are unforeseen
(ﬁner, or back-of-the-mind) contingencies that could affect the desirability of any ac-
tion. Though she does not understand these ﬁner details and is not able to describe
them, she is nevertheless aware that they exist, and she may feel that some may make
0 more desirable ex post and some may make  more desirable.
As explained in the next section, randomization may hedge this uncertainty and
thus the mixture might be strictly preferable to either lottery. The value of such hedging
via randomization has been emphasized in the literature on preferences under ambigu-
ity, starting with Schmeidler’s (1989) classic uncertainty aversion axiom. This connec-
tion is not a coincidence. In fact, coarseness can be viewed as a source of ambiguity.
We propose, and our model formalizes, that the impossibility of fully describing all rel-
evant contingencies is one reason, an important one in our view, why decision makers
may not be able to quantify uncertainty about future payoffs with a single probability
measure.
Toillustrate, consideragainaninvestordecidingonaportfolio. Ultimately, sheneed
be concerned only with the possible returns to securities and their likelihoods. How-
ever, in order to assess such likelihoods, she may think in terms of (economic, political,
or other) factors that could inﬂuence returns, and ﬁrst try to assess their likelihoods.
The crucial point is that even if she is able to assign probabilities to these “physical con-
tingencies,” a unique probability distribution for returns is not implied when contin-
gencies are coarse, because then each contingency does not pin down a unique return.
For concreteness, think of the extreme case where the investor’s ‘theory’ of returns is
vacuous—she conceives only that, with probability 1, something will happen tomorrow.
Since this theory is consistent with any probability distribution over returns, ambiguity
about returns is implied. Similarly, in more general choice contexts coarse contingen-
cies induce ambiguity about ex post preferences over alternatives, and thus over the
subjective state space.
We are not the ﬁrst to highlight the connection between coarse perceptions and am-
biguity. Mukerji (1997) and Ghirardato (2001) argue that an agent who is aware that she
hasonlyacoarseperceptionofthestatespacecanbethoughtofasusinganon-additive
probability measure (or capacity). Their approach, inspired by Dempster (1967) and
Shafer(1976), ismuchdifferentfromoursinthattheytaketheagent’scoarseperception
asaprimitive, whilerenderingitsubjectiveistheheartofourmodel. (SeeSection4.3for
further discussion of the connection to the present paper.) In fact, for reasons outlined
above, we go further and dispense also with an exogenously speciﬁed Savage-style set
of states. Thus we extend the literature on preferences under ambiguity by dropping the
primitive state space which is universal in that literature. In particular, we axiomatize a
counterpart of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) multiple-priors utility without relying on
an exogenously speciﬁed state space.358 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
1.2 Utility functions and interpretations
DLR assume the Independence axiom only in their most restrictive model (the additive
EU representation). We focus also on their weakest Independence-style axiom, called
Indifference to Randomization (IR), which they adopt (either explicitly or implicitly) in
all of their representation theorems.1 We argue that the case for IR is not clear-cut, at
leastgivenaparticularconceptionofcoarseperceptions. Thusweareledtoexploretwo
alternative directions: one which continues to assume IR and relaxes DLR’s Indepen-
dence axiom, and a second model which differs more substantially from DLR—not only
is IR dropped, but the domain of preference is expanded to include random menus.2 In
both cases, we describe axioms for preference that arguably capture ambiguity due to
coarse perceptions and that characterize functional forms for utility representing pref-
erence. The two alternative axiomatic models of preference are the main results of the
paper.






where  is a probability measure on ex post vNM utility functions u. (More precise
statements are given below.) Given u, the choice out of x maximizes u(), but ex ante,
the agent does not know which preference will prevail ex post. The support of , cor-
responding to the set of ex post preferences that she views as possible, constitutes her
subjective state space. To evaluate x, she computes its expected payoff assuming an
optimal choice of lottery in each subjective state. The representation suggests that sub-
jectivestatesareforeseenbytheagent, andwethereforeinterprettheDLRmodelasone
where states are foreseen.3
Foreaseofcomparison,wedescribeinformallyalsothetwogeneralizationsofW DLR







where  is a set of probability measures on the set of ex post vNM utility functions u.
(DLR is the special case where  is a singleton.) As in the interpretation of W DLR, the
agent observes the realization of some u and then chooses out of the menu x by maxi-
mizing u.
1DLR (p. 911) mention the case where ex post utilities are not vNM in the context of establishing a result
regarding minimality of the subjective state space. But such violations are not described as germane to the
issue of coarse contingencies.
2Nehring (1996, 1999) also adopts the domain of random menus. For more on the connection between
our second model and Nehring’s work see Appendix B.2.
3Kreps (1992) suggests that one can interpret the functional form alternatively as an “as if” representa-
tion for an agent who does not foresee the states, and that it is impossible to distinguish between these two
interpretations by observing only choice between menus.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 359








where  is a probability measure over suitable setsU of vNM utilities.
The main difference between the two models lies in ex post ambiguity. In the ﬁrst
model, W MP, the agent ex ante expects that ex post, before choosing from a menu, all
uncertainty will be resolved and a complete state will be realized. Therefore, there is no
ex post ambiguity. However, because of the coarseness of her ex ante perception, the
agent is not sure then about the likelihoods of her ex post preferences. Hence, W MP
has the multiple-priors functional form axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
where the likelihoods of subjective states are ambiguous.
In contrast, in the second model, W, the agent ex ante expects that even ex post she
will only have an incomplete perception of all relevant contingencies. As a result, she
expects to receive ex post only an ambiguous signal about her ex post preferences. In
the representation, this ambiguous signal is modeled by the set U. Since points within
eachU are foreseen, the minimization overU suggests complete ignorance withinU—
the agent foresees and can describe the details withinU but has no idea how likely they
are.4 From an ex ante perspective, utility W can then be interpreted as reﬂecting the ex-
pectationoffutureambiguity,duetotherealizationofanambiguoussignal.5 Ambiguity
persists ex post, and this makes ex post randomization valuable, thus violating IR.
The paper proceeds as follows. Next we outline the DLR model and argue that their
axioms preclude coarse contingencies and ambiguity. Then we describe two alternative
models to capture them. Proofs are relegated to appendices.
2. The DLR model
The DLR model has the following primitives.
 B: ﬁnite set of actions—let j B j= B
 (B): set of probability measures over B, endowed with the weak convergence
topology; generic lotteries are ,0,
,...
 X: closed subsets of (B), endowed with the Hausdorff metric; generic elements
are denoted x,x0,y,... and are called menus6
 preference  is deﬁned on X.
4Minimizing overU is equivalent to minimizing over all probability measures onU.
5If one overlooks the fact that the state space is exogenous only in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), then
our second model can be viewed as a special case of recursive multiple-priors, a multi-period extension of
the Gilboa–Schmeidler model—see Epstein and Schneider (2003).
6DLR do not restrict menus to be closed but this difference from their model is unimportant and we
overlook it throughout.360 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
The agent ranks menus at time 0 (ex ante) using  with the understanding that at
time 1 (ex post), she will choose a lottery from the previously chosen menu (see the
following time line).
 ———  ———  ——— 
choose state choose payoff
x realized  2x
One can think of a menu as corresponding to an action to be taken ex ante, where the
signiﬁcance of an ex ante action is that it limits options for further action ex post, that
is, for the choice of  in (B). There are no exogenous states of the world, but the agent
may envisagesome scenarios for time1. Sheanticipates learning which scenariois real-
ized before making her choice out of the menu. Thus her subjective conceptualization
of the future affects her expected choices out of menus and hence also her ex ante eval-
uation of menus. In other words, her subjective state space underlies the preference 
and (under suitable assumptions) is revealed by it.
For example, the ranking
f,0gfgf0g
reveals that the agent conceives of a circumstance in which she would strictly prefer
 over 0 and also another circumstance in which she would strictly prefer 0 over .
Under DLR’s set of axioms, subjective contingencies concern only the possible ex post
preference over lotteries. This is natural—payoffs rather than ex post physical states per
se are ultimately all that matter.
DLR assume throughout that preference satisﬁes the following two axioms.
Order  is complete and transitive.
Continuity For every menu x, the sets fy 2X :y xg and fy 2X :y xg are closed.
They occasionally, though not universally, adopt also the next axiom.
Monotonicity For all menus x0 and x, x0 x =)x0 x.
The axiom states that ﬂexibility has non-negative value. For concreteness, we restrict
attention here to models satisfying this property.
The ﬁrst problematic axiom that we consider is Independence.7 It refers to mixtures
of two menus as deﬁned by
x +(1 )y =f +(1 )
: 2x,
2yg.
Formally, the indicated mixture of x and y is another menu and thus when the agent
contemplates that menu ex ante, she anticipates choosing out of x +(1 )y ex post.
It follows that one should think of the randomization corresponding to the  and (1 )
weightsastakingplaceattheend—aftershehaschosensomemixedlottery+(1 )

out of the menu.
7DLR use the term Independence to refer to a condition weaker than the one stated below. However, the
two axioms are equivalent given their continuity axiom.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 361
Independence For all menus x0, x and y and 0<<1,
x0 x ()x0 +(1 )y x +(1 )y.
In the introduction we asserted that the axiom is not intuitive for an agent who is
aware of the coarseness of her perception of the relevant contingencies. Here we elab-
orate. The typical rationale for Independence (DLR, p. 905, for example) relies on two
claims. The ﬁrst claim is the intuitive appeal of the condition
x0 x =)x0 (1 )y x (1 )y, (1)
where x (1 )y denotes the lottery over menus that delivers x with probability 
and y with probability (1 ), and where the lottery is played out immediately, that is,
before any uncertainty is resolved. The second claim is that the agent should be indif-
ferent between the mixture x +(1 )y and the two-stage object x (1 )y. The
difference between these two ‘mixtures’ is in the timing of the randomization (or coin
toss). Inthelatter, thecoinistossedimmediately—aspeciﬁcmenuisrealizedbeforethe
agent sees a subjective state and chooses from the menu. In contrast, in x +(1 )y
the randomization is completed only at the end after choice out of the mixed menu.
However, we argue that this difference in timing matters when the agent is aware of the
incompleteness of her conceptualization, and that it is intuitive only that
x +(1 )y x (1 )y, (2)
thus refuting the case for the invariance asserted in Independence.
That the timing of randomization matters can be understood as follows: an agent
who is aware of the coarseness of her conception of the future might behave as though
shewereplayingagameagainstamalevolentnature. Shesuspectsthat, afterrealization
of a coarse contingency and after she has chosen an action (or lottery) ex post, nature
will complete the missing details in a way that is unfavorable for her. (She need not be
able to describe the details in order to feel this way.) Then, randomization that is com-
pleted immediately, before nature acts, does nothing to impede persecution by nature.
However, when randomization is completed only after nature moves, then nature is at
a disadvantage. For example, if x = fg and y = f
g, nature may be able to choose un-
derlying details that lead to a low payoff for  and other (different) details that lead to
an equally low payoff for 
, but then, in general, she cannot be as effective in sabotaging
the mixture  +(1 )
. The agent can expect this to be true in particular if states in
which  leads to a high (low) payoff are those in which 
 has a low (high) payoff, that
is, if  hedges 
. Though the agent cannot describe these ﬁne states, it sufﬁces that the
preceding lies beneath her coarse conception and is in the ‘back of her mind.’ Then late
randomization will be preferable, consistent with (2), and the latter can be understood
as due to the gain from hedging.8 The bottom line is that, because of hedging, the agent
8It is well-known in the theory of preference over lotteries (see Machina 1984, for example), that the
timing of randomization matters for the normative appeal of Independence if the agent must choose an
auxiliary action before the risk is resolved. Independence is intuitive if the coin toss corresponding to the
randomization is completed before the action choice, but not if it is completed only after the action must
be chosen. The argument here about timing is similar except that it is nature, rather than the agent, who
takes the auxiliary action.362 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)







Indifference to randomization (IR) For every menu x, x co(x).
To evaluate this axiom, it is important to understand precisely the meaning of the
time line sketched above. It describes the agent’s ex ante expectations, for example, that
expostshewillbeabletochoosefromthemenuthatischoseninitially. Thecriticalissue
is what information she expects to have at that point. In fact, it may very well be that
the true complete (Savage-like) state will be realized before she has to choose out of the
menu. Butsinceshedoesnotconceiveofthemexante,shecannotbethinkingexplicitly
in terms of the complete states that might be realized ex post. Rather, given her ex ante
conceptualization in terms of coarse contingencies, one natural assumption is that she
expectsonlytoknowwhichoftheseistruebeforechoosingoutofthemenu. Inthatcase,
she expects coarseness to persist even ex post. On the other hand, she need not foresee
all the complete states in order to believe that one of them will be realized ex post. Thus
an alternative assumption is that the agent anticipates that some complete state will be
realized ex post. The intuitive appeal of IR depends on which of these assumptions is
adopted.
If the agent anticipates that some complete state will be realized ex post, then she
can be certain that her ex post preference over lotteries will conform to vNM. Thus
she anticipates choosing out of the previously chosen menu x in order to maximize a
mixture linear utility over lotteries, which means that she will do as well choosing out of
x ex post as out of co(x). Being certain of this ex ante, she will be indifferent between x
and co(x). This is the justiﬁcation for Indifference to Randomization put forth by DLR.
Suppose, however, that coarseness is expected to persist ex post. Then the agent ex-
pects to be concerned ex post not only with how any given lottery  will play out, but
also with how (payoff-relevant) back-of-the-mind uncertainty will be resolved eventu-
ally. Then, just as described above in the discussion of Independence, randomization
may be valuable ex post. Anticipating this ex ante, she might strictly prefer co(x) to x,
violating IR. Both hypotheses concerning the agent’s expectations seem to us to be de-
scriptively plausible. Thus we formulate two alternative axiomatic models—one where
IR is imposed and one where the axioms reﬂect coarse perceptions that are expected to
persist.
Finally, we describe the most restrictive utility functional form characterized by
DLR—the so-called non-negative additive EU representation. To express it, note that
each mixture linear u : (B)  ! R1 can be identiﬁed with a (unique) vector in N  RB,
where the role of the subset N is to normalize vNM utilities so that each u corresponds
9co(x) = f +(1 )0 : ,0 2 x,0    1g denotes the convex hull of x. As in the case of Indepen-
dence, one should think of the randomization as occurring after choice is made out of the menu.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 363
to a unique ordering of lotteries. (DLR’s speciﬁcation of N is not important here; later






where  is a probability measure on N and u()=b2B(b)ub =u .
3. Model 1: Short-run coarseness
Here we consider an agent who has coarse contingencies in mind ex ante, but who ex-
pects to see a complete state ex post before choosing out of a menu. As in DLR, prefer-
ence is deﬁned on the set X of menus, and satisﬁes Order, Monotonicity, and Indiffer-
ence to Randomization. Other axioms are relaxed or modiﬁed as we now describe.
First exclude total indifference.
Nondegeneracy x0 x for some menus x0 and x.
Our principal deviation from DLR is to relax Independence. From the argument
surrounding (1)–(2) regarding the gains from hedging, we are led to the following weak-
ening of Independence.
Preference convexity x0 x =)x0 +(1 )x x.
The intuition that ‘hedging’ motives may render randomization valuable recalls the
intuition provided in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for their relaxation of Independence
designed to accommodate ambiguity aversion. Preference Convexity can in fact be un-
derstood as arising from the ambiguity aversion of an agent who is not sure about the
likelihoods of her subjective states.
Suppose the agent ex ante foresees each possible u, an ex post utility function over
lotteries. Then she presumably anticipates choosing out of any given menu condition-
ally on the realization of each u. For example, given x, she anticipates choosing the
lottery u if u is realized. Thus the menu x is equivalent for her to the (lottery-valued)
act given by u 7 ! u. Similarly, x0 can be identiﬁed with an act u 7 ! 0
u. Then x0  x
translates into the weak preference for the primed act over the unprimed one. If states
are ambiguous for her, then, as argued by Gilboa and Schmeidler, she may strictly prefer
the -mixture of these two acts to u. But the mixed act is feasible for her by choosing
conditionally on each u if she has the menu x0 +(1 )x, and thus she can do at least
as well with the latter menu as with x, which ‘proves’ Preference Convexity.
We adopt two additional axioms that are admittedly “excess baggage”—they express
ex ante certainty about the payoffs to a speciﬁc alternative b in B and certainty also
that it will be the worst outcome (hence also lottery) ex post.
Fix b in B. Deﬁne a dominance relation on lotteries by
 D 0 if (b)0(b) and (b)0(b) for all b 6=b.364 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Thus  may be obtained from 0 by shifting probability mass from b to other actions.
Since the agent is certain that b will be worst ex post (and that ex post preference will
conform to vNM), she can be certain that she will prefer  to 0 and hence that she
would not choose 0 (alone) if  is available; that is, 0 has no ﬂexibility value if  is
feasible ex post. We extend this intuition by ﬁrst extending the dominance relation to
menus. Say that x dominates x0, written x D x0, if for every 0 in x0 there exists  in x
such that  D 0. If x D x0, the agent can be certain of doing as well choosing out of x
as out of x [x0. This explains the next axiom.
Worst For all menus x0 and x, if x D x0, then x x [x0.
Given our other axioms, Worst implies that, for all menus x,
(B) B x fbg and B fbg.
By IR and Monotonicity, B  (B)  x. On the other hand, x D fbg for any x. Thus
Worst and Monotonicity imply that x x [fbgfbg. We conclude that
B x fbg. (4)
Finally, B fbg would imply total indifference, contrary to Nondegeneracy.
Though certain that b will be worst and (B) (or B) best, the agent may never-
theless be uncertain about the cardinal payoffs to each; moreover, cardinal payoffs are
important when the agent evaluates menus ex ante and must weigh payoffs across all
possible contingencies. We assume that, in fact, expected cardinal payoffs to both b
and (B) are certain ex ante, where the payoff to (B) refers to the payoff to the lottery
chosen out of (B) ex post—the chosen lottery, but not its payoff, may vary with the
(back-of-the-mind) state. If the cardinal payoffs to b and (B) are certain, then so are
the payoffs to all lotteries of the form xp =p(B)+(1 p)b, for any p in the unit inter-
val.10 Therefore, mixing with such lotteries provides no hedging gains, which suggests
thattheinvariancerequiredbyIndependenceshouldbesatisﬁedforsuchmixtures. This
explains:
Certainty independence For all menus x0 and x, and xp = p(B)+(1 p)b, and for all
0<<1,
x0 x ()x0 +(1 )xp x +(1 )xp.
Finally, we assume a mild form of continuity à la Herstein and Milnor (1953).
Mild continuity For all menus x, the sets fp 2 [0,1] :xp  xg and fp 2 [0,1] :xp  xg are
closed.
10p(B)+(1 p)b =fpq +(1 p)b :q 2(B)g, a menu of lotteries.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 365
To describe the implied functional form, note that any vNM ex post preference that







 D 0 ()u  u 0 for all u in N. (5)
Our ﬁrst model is summarized in the following result.
Theorem 1. Preference  on X satisﬁes Order, Monotonicity, Indifference to Random-
ization, Nondegeneracy, Preference Convexity, Worst, Certainty Independence, and Mild







where  is a convex and weak-compact set of Borel probability measures on N.
Moreover, there exists  that is smallest (in the sense of set inclusion) amongst sets
satisfying the above. The set  is a singleton (and so W MP has the DLR form) if and only
if, for all x, x0 2X and all 2[0,1],
x x0 =)x +(1 )x0 x. (7)
If preference satisﬁes Independence, then every menu satisﬁes (7), and the theo-
rem yields (a variant of) the DLR representation result for the non-negative additive EU
representation (3).
We pointed out earlier that the axioms, particularly Preference Convexity, are intu-
itive for an agent who foresees complete states whose likelihoods are ambiguous. Thus
the theorem can be viewed as extending Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) multiple-priors
utility model by dispensing with an exogenous state space. At a formal level, Theorem 1
is not a trivial variation of the representation result in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Our axioms deliver a (superlinear and translation invariant) preference functional de-
ﬁned only on the convex cone of support functions, a meager subset of the set of all
continuous functions on N; in particular, the cone has an empty interior under the sup-
norm topology. For this reason we have to use techniques different from the ones used
in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and we exploit the notion of niveloid developed in
Maccheroni et al. (2006). The smallness of the domain on which the preference func-
tional is deﬁned results in the non-uniqueness of the set  of the representation (6), the
domain not being big enough to pin down a single set of priors, but only a smallest one.
11If there exists b0 6=b such that (b0) < 0(b0), then u  < u 0 for u deﬁned by ub0 = 1 and ub = 0 for
b 6=b0.366 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
4. Model 2: Persistent coarseness
Section 2 argued that IR is not intuitive if ex ante coarseness is expected to persist. Here
we describe a second model designed to capture this conception of coarseness. We de-
viate more drastically from DLR, beginning with the adoption of an expanded domain
for preference—we assume that the agent ranks not only menus but all random menus.
In this respect, and also in the nature of our central axiom called Dominance, our ap-
proachisclosertothatofNehring(1996,1999), asdevelopedandgeneralizedbyEpstein
and Seo (2007).
The sets B, (B), and X are as above. Preference  is deﬁned on (X).12 Generic
elements of (X) are denoted P, P0, Q, ...and are referred to as random menus. As
indicated by the time line below, for any random menu P chosen ex ante, a menu x is
realized next, and then, as in DLR and in our ﬁrst model, the agent expects to see some
subjective uncertainty resolved and ﬁnally to choose from the realized menu. A differ-
encefromourﬁrstmodelisthathere,iftheagentthinksintermsofcoarsecontingencies
ex ante, then she expects only to see one of those coarse contingencies ex post.
 ———  ———  ——— 
choose x coarse state choose
P realized realized  2x
4.1 Utility
Ex post payoff functions are continuous functions v : (B) ! R satisfying suitable nor-
malizations. To express them, ﬁx two actions b and b, identiﬁed with degenerate lot-
teries, interpreted as the worst and best lotteries ex post. This exacerbates somewhat
the problem of “excess baggage” in our ﬁrst model, since we now assume that not only
the worst, but also the best lottery is ﬁxed exogenously. Every vNM ex post preference
overlotteriesthat(isnottotalindifferenceandthat)ranksb asworstandb asbestmay
be represented by some u in N, where
N =fu 2[0,1]B :u(b)=0, u(b)=1g.
However, the agent does not conceive of all of these possibilities ex ante—rather she
thinks in terms of subsets of N. Denote by K (N) the set of closed subsets of N, en-
dowed with the Hausdorff metric, which renders it compact metric. Say that U  N
is comprehensive if U = fu 0 2 N : u 0  u for some u 2 Ug. Denote by K cc(N) the set
of closed, convex, and comprehensive subsets of N. (Then K cc(N) is also compact
metric.)













12The set X is compact metric (and so Polish) under the Hausdorff metric. It is endowed with the Borel
-algebra. Thus (X) is the set of Borel probability measures. It is also compact Polish under the weak-
convergence topology. The set (X) has similar meaning for any metric space X.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 367
for some Borel probability measure  2 (K cc(N)). Say that  represents the corre-
sponding preference.
To interpret, note ﬁrst that preference conforms to vNM theory when evaluating lot-













u()d(U), x 2X. (9)
Since W represents the ranking of (nonrandom) menus, it can be compared with DLR’s
utility function (3), to whichW reduces if  has support on singletons.13 More generally,
the functional form (9) might describe an agent who conceives ex ante of the complete
states in N, but does not expect to see the true state ex post. Rather, she expects only
a “signal” U to be realized ex post. There is no prior ambiguity about the likelihoods
of signals; however, each signal is “ambiguous”—it will inform the agent that the true
subjective state u lies inU, but leave her completely ignorant otherwise.14
Note that the restriction to sets U that are convex and comprehensive is without
loss of generality—for any closed set U, minu2U u() is unchanged if we replace U by
its convex hull, or if we add to U points u 0 in N such that u 0  u for some u 2 U.
The normalization to convex and comprehensive sets permits us to show below that the
representing measure  is unique.
Finally, for perspective, consider the alternative functional form obtained by revers-








In general, W rev is ordinally distinct from W. This is suggested by the fact that the mini-
maxtheoremjustifyingsuchreversalsoforderrequiresthatbothsetsx andU beconvex,
but menus need not be convex. Preference represented by W rev satisﬁes all the assump-
tions of Theorem 1, including IR, and so it is a special case of that model. However,
preference represented by W violates IR in general.
4.2 Axioms and representation result
Let  be a preference order on (X). We assume that it is complete and transitive (Or-
der), continuous in the usual sense (Continuity), and that it is not total indifference
(Nondegeneracy).
13More precisely, since  is deﬁned only on comprehensive sets, DLR is the special case where  has
support on sets of the form fu 0 2N  :u 0 ug for some u in N .
14It can be shown that this is a special case of the recursive multiple-priors utility studied by Epstein and
Schneider (2003) (though the information structure is exogenous there and subjective here).368 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
We assume also that preference satisﬁes a form of independence. To distinguish it
from the Independence axiom in DLR, we give it another name.
First-stage independence For all random menus P, P0 andQ and for all 0 <  < 1, P0 
P ()P0 +(1 )Q P +(1 )Q.
Since a mixture such as P +(1 )Q is a random menu, it follows from the time
line described above that a speciﬁc menu is realized before the agent sees a subjective
state and chooses from the menu. In particular, therefore, all randomization in both
component measures P and Q as well as in the mixing is completed before then. As
explained in our discussion of the DLR model, this difference in timing differentiates
First-Stage Independence from DLR’s Independence, and there are no hedging gains
from immediate randomization.15
Our key axiom is adapted from Nehring (1996, 1999) and Epstein and Seo (2007).
Its statement makes use of the fact that, by Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 3.63),
fx 2 X : x Gg is open in X for every open subset G  (B). Therefore, for any menu
y,
fx 2X :x \y 6=?g=X nfx 2X :x (B)nyg
is closed, hence Borel measurable.
Let Y be a set of menus, each of which is interpreted as an upper contour set for
some ex post preference order that the agent views as possible. Deferring for a moment
the precise speciﬁcation of Y, consider the following axiom.
Dominance If P0(fx 2X :x \y 6=?g)P(fx 2X :x \y 6=?g) for all menus y in Y, then
P0 P.
Say that P0 dominates P if the condition in the axiom is satisﬁed.
Consider two implications of the axiom.16 First, when P0 = x0 and P = x are de-
generate, then x0 dominates x if x0 x. Therefore, Dominance implies Monotonicity:
x0 x =)x0 x.
It also implies (given First-Stage Independence) Kreps’ (1979) second key axiom (condi-



















15First-Stage Independence corresponds to, and generalizes, condition (1). A difference is that since only
here is preference deﬁned on random menus, then only here is the axiom formally meaningful.
16Nehring (1996, 1999) makes a similar observation for his setting. Note that these implications are valid
for any speciﬁcation of Y, and not just for the one given below.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 369
Deduce from First-Stage Independence that
x0 x\x0 =)x x[x0.
Since Monotonicity is also implied, we have ﬁnally that (in the obvious notation)
x \x0 x0 =)x x [x0,
which is equivalent to Kreps’ axiom.17
To understand further the meaning of the axiom, think of each y in Y as an upper
contour set for some conceivable ex post preference. Thus lotteries in y are “desirable”
according to that ex post preference and x \y 6= ; indicates that x contains at least one
desirable action, in which case we might refer to x as being desirable. Accordingly, P0
dominates P if the probability of the realization of a desirable menu is larger under P0,
andifthisistrueforeverysety andhenceforeveryconceivabledeﬁnitionof“desirable.”
ThesetY speciﬁeswhichuppercontoursetsarerelevant,or,inotherwords,Dominance
for the given Y implies certainty that ex post upper contour sets lie in Y.
The content of the axiom depends on the speciﬁcationof Y, which we now describe.
Fix actions b and b, and say that 0 is an elementary improvement of  if
either 0   =b  b for some b 6=b
or 0   = b +b for some b 6=b.
Intheﬁrstcase,probabilitymassisshiftedfromsomeoutcomeb tob andinthesecond
mass is shifted from b to some other outcome. Both shifts are unambiguous improve-
ments if b and b are the best and worst actions respectively. In particular, if that is the
case, then 0 dominates  in the sense of the ﬁrst-order-stochastic dominance relation
induced by the ranking of actions.
Assume that Y consists of all nonempty sets y satisfying the following properties.18
Y1 y is closed and convex.
Y2 If 0 is an elementary improvement of , and  2y, then 0 2y.
Y3 [0 62y, q 62y for all q <p]=)0 +(1 )p 62y for all >0.
To interpret these conditions in the context of Dominance, think again of Y as con-
sisting of ex post upper contour sets that the agent thinks possible ex ante. For Y1, y
being closed reﬂects certainty that ex post preferences will be (upper semi) continuous.
Convexity expresses the certainty that randomization will be (weakly) valuable. The ex-
pectation of indifference to randomization ex post would be captured by adding the
requirement that the complement y c (a strict lower contour set) also be convex.19 The
absence of this requirement permits a role for randomization ex post.
17The latter is usually stated in the form x x0 [x =)x [x00 x0 [(x [x00).
18p denotes the lottery (b,p;b,1 p).
19Suppose that y c is convex for every y in Y. Then y \x = ? =)x  y c =) co(x)  y c =) y \co(x) = ?,
and x dominates co(x). By Dominance, therefore, x co(x). Thus they must be indifferent by Monotonic-
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PropertyY2statesthatanyelementaryimprovementofalotteryinanuppercontour
sety isalsoiny. Thusitexpressescertaintythatb andb arethebestandworstactions
respectively. An immediate implication is that
[q 2y and p >q]=)p 2y. (10)
Iterating Y2 yields
b 2y for every y
and
b 2y only if y =(B).




back-of-the-mind details; and similarly forb. Thus there is conditional certainty about
the cardinal payoffs tob andb, from which it follows that there should be conditional
certainty also about the cardinal payoffs to all mixtures p = (b,p;b,1 p). But then
mixing with p (or with any q) should provide no hedging gains. In that case, the agent
should not expect 0 +(1 )p to be better than both component lotteries, each of
which is undesirable (in the sense of not lying in y). In other words, 0+(1 )p 62y.
Finally, suppose that p does indeed lie in y, but only barely in the sense that
q 62 y for all q < p. Since y is closed and 0 62 y, it falls short by a discrete amount
from being desirable according to y. Since p is just barely in y, mixing with p is
not enough to compensate for the deﬁciency in 0. Therefore, again we conclude that
0 +(1 )p62y.
If the cardinal payoffs to b and b are expected to be certain conditional on each
coarse contingency, then not only should randomization with any p be of no value ex
post, as just argued in connection with Y3, but also ex ante there should be no hedging
gains. But hedging gains were the only reason for arguing that the timing of randomiza-
tion should matter and hence that indifference in (2) is not intuitive. This explains the
ﬁnal axiom.20
Certainty reversal of order For every menu x0 2X, 0<<1, and 0p 1,
x0 (1 )fpgx0 +(1 )fpg.
We can now state our second main result.
Theorem 2.  satisﬁes Order, Continuity, Nondegeneracy, First-Stage Independence,
Dominance, and Certainty Reversal of Order if and only if it has a representation of the
form (8). Moreover, the representing measure  in (8) is unique.
20In more accurate but less friendly notation, the axiom asserts that x0 +(1 )fpg x0+(1 )fpg.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 371
IfCertaintyReversalofOrderisstrengthenedsoastoapplytoallpairsofmenus,that
is, to require indifference in (2) for all x0 and x, then First-Stage Independence implies
Independence,andallsubjectivestatesaresingletons(uptobeingcomprehensive)asin
DLR—coarseness is excluded. Alternatively, the latter model is obtained if Dominance
is strengthened by shrinking Y so that, in addition to Y1–Y3, every y in Y is required to
have a convex complement (which leads to indifference to randomization (IR)).
Finally, with respect to uniqueness of the measure, the theorem establishes unique-
ness of  amongst all representations that use N as the state space. However, there is
nothing special about our choice of normalizing the lowest and highest utility levels at
0 and 1 respectively. We could equally well have used any other state space for which
payoffs to b and b are constant, that is, where u1(b) = u2(b) < u1(b) = u2(b) for all
u1 andu2 inthestatespace. LetN0 andN00 betwosuchsetsandlet0 and00 bethecor-
responding representations as delivered by Theorem 2 (suitably extended). Then there
exist >0 and  2R such that N00 =N0+, and such thatU00 2K cc(N00) if and only if
 1(U00  ) 2 K cc(N0). Therefore, the uniqueness part of the theorem implies, assum-
ing ﬁnite supports for simplicity, that 00(U00)=0( 1(U00 )) for allU00 2K cc(N). The
representing measure is unique up to such linear transformations, reﬂecting the choice
of normalization for b and b.
4.3 Dempster and Shafer-style models
Finally, we relate the model (9) to the Dempster–Shafer-style models of Mukerji (1997)
and Ghirardato (2001) mentioned in the introduction. They suppose that while there
exists a Savage-style state spaceS, the agent does not conceive of all the complete states
inS andhascoarseperceptions. Thesearemodeledthroughanauxiliaryepistemicstate
space 
 and a correspondence   from 
 intoS. (See the ﬁgure below.) There is a proba-











Unlike a Savage agent who would view each physical action as an act fromS to the out-
come set X, and who would evaluate it via its expected utility (using a probability mea-
sure onS), the present agent views each action as a (possibly multi-valued) act on 
.
Ghirardato assumes that each b f is multi-valued, where the nonsingleton nature of
b f (!) reﬂects her awareness that ! is a coarse contingency. Its utility is given by











andtheacts b f aretakentobeobjectiveandhenceobservable
to the analyst. One can view our model (9) as one possible way to render them subjec-
tive: take X =R1, 
=Supp()K cc(N), and p =, where  is the measure appearing372 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
in our representation; and identify each lottery  in (B) with the multi-valued act b ,
b  :U  !fu():u 2Ug.
Then
VG(b )=W(fg).
Turn to the rest of the triangle (11). It is commutative if b f (!) = f ( (!)). This is
satisﬁed in our model if we takeS =N and  (U)=U N.
Finally, we can write




where  is the non-additive measure or capacity21
(A)=(f!: (!)Ag),
and the integral on the right is in the sense of Choquet (see Schmeidler 1989). Since
Schmeidler’sChoquetexpectedutilitymodelwasdevisedinordertoaccommodateam-
biguity, this demonstrates once again the close connection between coarse perceptions
and ambiguity.
Though there are differences in detail, similar remarks apply to Mukerji (1997); in
particular, our model can be viewed as a way to endogenize the state spaces 
 andS, as
well as the correspondence  , all of which are taken as primitives by Mukerji.
Appendix
A. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1




u  = max
2co(x)
u  for any x.
The proof of sufﬁciency is quite long. We provide the complete argument here, in-
cludingpreliminaryresultsonniveloidswhichareformulatedforasettingmoreabstract
than ours and which extend some results of Maccheroni et al. (2006). The proof of the
minimality of the set  is based on a result of Ergin and Sarver (2005).
A.1 Preliminaries
We begin with some preliminaries. Let C be a convex subset of a normed vector space.
A function h :C !R is quasiconvex if
h(t0 +(1 t)00)maxfh(0),h(00)g 80,00 2C.
It is quasiconcave if  f is quasiconvex, and it is quasimonotone if it is both quasiconvex
and quasiconcave.
The following result is due to Greenberg and Pierskalla (1971, p. 1559).
21More precisely, it corresponds to the special case where  is a belief function.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 373
Lemma A.1. Let h :C !R be continuous. Then h is quasimonotone if and only if the sets
f :h()=cg are convex for all c 2R.




where T :C K !R is continuous on K and afﬁne on C, i.e., for each 0,00 2C,
T(t0 +(1 t)00,y)=tT(0,y)+(1 t)T(00,y) 8y 2 K.





Say that h is afﬁne on some convex subset Q  C if h(1 + (1   )2) = h(1) +
(1 )h(2) for all 2[0,1] and all 1,2 2Q.












i2I i =1ifandonlyif \i2I(i)6=





(ii) Let Q C be a convex set. Then h is afﬁne onQ if and only if \2Q()6=;.
(iii) Given c 2R, the set h 1(c)=f 2C :h()=cg is convex only if \2h 1(c)()6=;.
Proof. In points (i) and (ii) we prove the “only if,” the converse being trivial.
















On the other hand, b yi 2(i) implies
T(i,b yi)T(i,b y) 8i 2 I.

















\i2I(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i=1ih(i) for any ﬁnite collection figi2I  Q and any figi2I with i 2 [0,1] and P
i2I i =1. By the previous point, \i2I(i)6=;. As all sets () are compact, the Finite
Intersection Property implies that \2Q()6=;.
(iii) Let 1,2 2h 1(c). As h 1(c) is convex,
h(1 +(1 )2)=h(1)+(1 )h(2) 82[0,1].
By the previous point, \2h 1(c)()6=;. 
Lemma A.3. Let Q C be a convex set and suppose h is continuous. Then h is afﬁne onQ
if and only if h is quasiconvex onQ and there exists 
 2Q such that, for all  2 [0,1] and
all  2Q,
h()h(
) and h( +(1 )
)=h()+(1 )h(
).
In this case, there exists y 2 K such that
h()=T(,y) 8 2Q. (A.4)
Proof. For “only if,” take 
 2 argmin2(B)h(). Consider now the “if” part. First ob-
servethath isquasimonotone, andso byLemmaA.1 itslevelsetsh 1(c)=f :h()=cg
are convex for all c 2R. By Lemma A.2(iii),
\2h 1(c) ()6=; 8c 2R. (A.5)
Set e Q = f 2Q : h() > h(
)g. Let 1,2 2 e Q and suppose h(1)  h(2). If h(1) = h(2),
then
h(1 +(1 )2)=h(1)+(1 )h(2) 82[0,1]
since h is quasimonotone. Suppose h(1) > h(2). There exists  2 (0,1) such that
h(2) = h(1) + (1   )h(
) = h(1 + (1   )












so that T(1,b y) = h(1). Hence b y 2 (1), and we conclude that (1)\(2) 6= ;. By
Lemma A.2(i), h(1 + (1   )2) = h(1) + (1   )h(2) for all  2 [0,1], and so the
function h is afﬁne on e Q.
Let  2 Q be such that h() = h(
). If  2 Q is also such that h() = h(
), then
h(t+(1 t))=th()+(1 t)h() since h is quasimonotone. Suppose that  2 e Q.
Given 2[0,1], set  = +(1 ). Since h is concave and h()>h(), we have
h()h()+(1 )h()>h() 82(0,1]Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 375








and so we can conclude that h is afﬁne on Q. By Lemma A.2(ii), \2Q() 6= ;. Any
y 2\2Q() satisﬁes (A.4). 
A.2 Niveloids
Let (E,,kk) be a normed Riesz space and let H be a convex cone in E containing an
order unit e.22 Say that kk is an e-norm if there exists k >0 such that jf jkkf ke for all
f 2 E. Throughout we consider only e-norms.
Example A.1. Each normed Riesz space has a natural e-norm, called the e-uniform
Riesz norm, given by
kf ke =inffk 0:jf jkeg.
In this case, jf j  kf kee for all f 2 E (see de Jonge and van Rooij 1977, p. 103). For
example, if E is a function space and e is 1
, then kke is the supnorm. 
Lemma A.4. If h1,h2 2H, then h1 +h2 2H.
A functional I :H !R with I(0)=0 is an e-niveloid if it is monotone, I(e)=1, and
I(h +e)= I(h)+ for all h 2H and 0.
If the preceding is true also for all  < 0 such that h +e 2 H, say that I is e-translation
invariant.
Lemma A.5. Any e-niveloid I : H ! R is Lipschitz continuous and e-translation invari-
ant. Moreover, I is concave if and only if it is quasiconcave.
Remark. Observe that Lemma A.5 applies to any e-niveloid on a convex cone.
Proof. For translation invariance, if <0, then
I(h)+= I(h +e  e)+= I(h +e) += I(h +e).
For the Lipschitz property, argue as follows. If f ,g 2H, then f  g jf  gj. As kk is
an e-norm, we have jf  gjkkf  gke, and so f  g +kkf  gke. By the monotonicity
of I, we have I(f ) I(g)kkf   gk.
22Thatis, E isalatticeundertheorderandthenormkkissuchthat,forall f ,g 2 E,kf kkgkwhenever
jf jjgj. Recall that jf j= f ++ f   = f _0+( f )_0, and that e 2 E+ is an order unit if for each f 2 E there is
>0 such that jf j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Finally, suppose I is quasiconcave. Let f ,g 2 H with I(f )  I(g) and set  = I(f ) 
I(g). Then I is concave, because, for all t 2[0,1],
I(t f +(1 t)g)+(1 t)= I(t f +(1 t)(g +e))
t I(f )+(1 t)I(g +e)
=t I(f )+(1 t)I(g)+(1 t). 
Let (E,,kk) be a Banach lattice with topological dual E. Denote by E
+ the set of
all monotone elements in E and let  = fL 2 E
+ : L(e) = 1g. Recall that a functional
I :H !R is superlinear if it is positively homogeneous and superadditive, i.e., I(f +g)
I(f )+ I(g) for all f ,g 2 H. Superlinearity and concavity are equivalent properties for
positively homogeneous functionals.
Theorem A.1. Suppose E is a separable Banach lattice with E = H  H. Let I : H ! R
be a quasiconcave and positively homogeneous e-niveloid. Then there exists a greatest
superlinear e-niveloid b I : E !R that extends I, that is, J  b I pointwise for any extension




L(f ) 8f 2H.
The set   is a singleton if and only if I is additive.
Proof. Deﬁne I 0 : E !R by
I 0(f )= sup
g2H,2R
fI(g)+: g +e  f g.
Then I 0 is a superlinear e-niveloid that extends I: It is readily veriﬁed that I 0 = I on H,
and that I 0 is monotone and e-translation invariant. In addition,
 I 0 is superadditive: Suppose that f1, f2 2 E and I 0(f1 + f2) < I 0(f1)+ I 0(f2). Then
there exist g1,g2 2 H and 1,2 2 R, with g1 +1e  f1 and g2 +2e  f2, such
that
I 0(f1 + f2)< I(g1)+1 +I(g2)+2  I(g1 + g2)+1 +2,
a contradiction because g1 + g2 2H and g1 + g2 +(1 +2)e  f1 + f2.
 I 0 is positively homogeneous: Given any  0 and f 2 E, we have
I 0( f )= sup
g2H,2R












































e  f g=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Let e I : E ! R be any superlinear e-niveloid that extends I. The superdifferential
@ e I(f ) at f 2 E is given by
@ e I(f )=fL 2 E : e I(g) e I(f )+L(g   f )8g 2 Eg. (A.6)
Since e I isconcaveandLipschitzcontinuous(byLemmaA.5), @ e I(f )isnonempty, convex
and weak-compact for each f 2 E (see Phelps 1993, Proposition 1.11).
We now show that e I(f ) = minL2@ e I(0)L(f ): Let L 2 @ e I(f ). If we take g = 0 in (A.6),
we get e I(f )  L(f ), while if we take g = 2f , then we get e I(f )  L(f ). We conclude that
e I(f )= L(f ). Thisimpliesthat@ e I(f )=fL 2@ e I(0): L(f )= e I(f )gand e I(f )=minL2@ e I(0)L(f ).
Next we show that @ e I(0)  . Fix f 2 E and L 2 @ e I(0). Then e I(f +e)  L(f +e)
for all 2R, and so e I(f ) L(f )+(L(e)  e I(e)) for all 2R. This contradicts e I(f )> 1
unless L(e) = e I(e) = 1. It remains to prove that @ e I(0)  E
+: L 2 @ e I(0) =) L(f )  e I(f )  0
for every f 2 E+ by the monotonicity of e I. Therefore @ e I(0).
Deﬁne I  : E ! R by I (L) = infh2HfL(h)   I(h)g. Then I (L) = 0 for L 2 @ e I(0).
Therefore, for each f 2 E,





By Ergin and Sarver (2005, Propn. 2), there is a convex weak-compact set   such that23
I(h)=min
L2 
fL(h) I (L)g 8h 2H,




fL(h) I (L)g 8h 2H.
Since




fL(h) I (L)g 8h 2H,
it follows that  @ e I(0). Hence the functional b I : E !R given by
b I(f )=min
L2 
L(f ) 8f 2 E
is the greatest superlinear e-niveloid that extends I on E, that is, b I  e I for any superlin-
ear e-niveloid e I extending I.
As a result,   is the desired smallest set. In fact, let  0   be any other convex and
weak-compact set such that I(f ) = minL2 0 L(f ) for all f 2 H. Deﬁne e I : E ! R by
e I(f ) = minL02 L(f ). The functional e I is a superlinear e-niveloid that extends I, and so
b I  e I, which in turn implies   0.
Finally, suppose I is additive. By Lemma A.5, I is Lipschitz and so by the Hahn–
Banach Theorem it admits a unique linear extension J : E !R. Hence J  b I and
J(f )= J( f ) b I( f ) b I(f ) J(f ) 8f 2 E,
which implies J = b I and  =fJg. 
23Ergin and Sarver’s result shows the existence of a smallest weak-compact set. Its closed convex hull is
then the smallest convex and weak-compact set.378 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Given a convex subset G containing both 0 and e, let hGi be the vector subspace it
generates.
Corollary A.1. Let G be a convex subset containing both 0 and e of a separable Banach






Then there exists a smallest convex and weak-compact set   such that
W(f )=min
L2 
L(f ) 8f 2G. (A.7)
The set   is a singleton if and only if W is afﬁne.
Proof. Let H =
S
>0G be the cone generated byG. For each h 2H, there exists >0
such that h=2H. Deﬁne I :H !R by I(h)=W(h=).
The functional I is well deﬁned: suppose that, for a given h 2 H, there exist , > 0




































as desired. Observe that h= 2G and   imply h=2G. Hence, given any h1,h2 2H,
there exists   1 such that hi= 2 G and I(hi) = W(hi=) for each i = 1,2. This
property will be tacitly used in the sequel.
The functional I is clearly positively homogeneous and is an e-niveloid. We now
show that it is quasiconcave on H. Given any h1,h2 2 H, there exists  > 0 such that









































Thus I is quasiconcave. By Theorem A.1, there is a smallest convex and weak-compact
set   such that
I(f )=min
L2 
L(f ) 8f 2H.
In particular,   is a singleton if and only if I is additive. Hence,   is such that (A.7) holds,
anditisthesmallestsuchset: Suppose 0 isanothersetforwhich(A.7)holds. DeﬁneTheoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 379





L2 0 L(f ) 8f 2 E,
which implies     0. Since I is additive if and only if W is afﬁne, this completes the
proof. 
A.3 Application
Let (N) be the set of all Borel probability measures on N and C(N) be the set of all
continuous functions on N. Endow C(N) with the supnorm kks and deﬁne an order 
on C(N) by f  g if f (u) g(u) for all u 2N.
The triple (C(N),,kks) forms a separable Banach lattice; its dual is given by the set
of all bounded Borel measures and the set  of Theorem A.1 is given by (N). Moreover,
1N is an order unit e that makes kks an e-norm, while the 0 is the function on N that is
identically zero.
Denote by  the set of all support functions x : N ! R, given by x(u) =
max2x  u for each u 2 N and x 2 X. Then  is a convex subset of C(N) contain-
ing both e and 0. For the latter, note that (B) =1N and fbg =0.
ForthissettingwehavethefollowingversionofaclassicresultofHörmander(1955).
Lemma A.6. C(N) is the supnorm closure of hi.
Proof. Since 0 2 , we have hi = [>0 [>0. By proceeding as in Hörmander
(1955, p. 185), we can show that hi is a Riesz subspace of C(N). Moreover, given u,u 0 2
N with u 6= u 0 there is  2 (N) such that  u 6=  u 0. Hence, fg(u) 6= fg(u 0) and
so hi separates the points of N. Since hi also contains 1N, application of the lattice
version of the Stone–Weierstrass Theorem completes the proof. 
The next result is an immediate consequence of Corollary A.1 and Lemmas A.3, A.5,
and A.6. Observe that a weak-compact subset of (N) is weakly compact.












The set  is a singleton if and only if W is quasimonotone.
We turn ﬁnally to the proof of Theorem 1. Adopt the hypotheses stated there.380 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Lemma A.7. There exists W : X ! R that represents  and such that, for each x,x0 2 X,
2[0,1], and xp 2C,
W(x +(1 )xp)=W(x)+(1 )p
W(x +(1 )x0)minfW(x),W(x0)g.
The functional W is unique up to positive afﬁne transformations.
Proof. The set C = fxp  p(B)+(1 p)b : p 2 [0,1]g is a convex subset of the vector
space f(B)+b :, 2Rg. In fact, for all xp,xq 2C and all 2[0,1],
xp+(1 )xq =xp +(1 )xq =p(B)+(1 p)b +(1 )q(B)+(1 q)b
=(p(B) +(1 p)b)+(1 )(q(B) +(1 q)b)
=(p +(1 )q)(B) +(1 p  (1 )q)b
=(p+(1 )q)(B)+(1 p (1 )q)b =xp+(1 )q
and so xp +(1 )xq =xp+(1 )q.
Because  satisﬁes the vNM axioms on C (for example, Mild Continuity implies the
Archimedean axiom on C), there exists an afﬁne function u :C ! R, unique up to posi-
tive afﬁne transformations, such that xp xp0 if and only if u(xp)u(xp0). Normalize u
so that u(b)=0 and u((B))=1. Hence,
u(xp)=u(p(B)+(1 p)b)=pu((B))+(1 p)u(b)=p. (A.8)
Any x 2X satisﬁes (4), that is, (B)x b. By Mild Continuity there exists a p 2[0,1]
such that xp x. Such p is unique since, by (A.8), xp xq if and only if p =q.
Set W(x) = u(xp) = p. Clearly, x  x0 if and only if W(x)  W(x0), and W is the
unique functional on X representing  that reduces to u on C.
Consider x 2 X and xp 2 C. There exists xq 2 C such that x  xq. By Certainty
Independence,





Finally, quasiconcavity of W is a direct consequence of Preference Convexity. 
For any menu x, deﬁne its D-hull by
hull(x)=f0 2(B): D 0 for some  2xg.
If x is convex, then so is hull(x).Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 381
Lemma A.8. (i) For any convex x and 0 2(B)nhull(x), there exists u in N such that
x(u)<u(0). (A.9)
(ii) For any convex x and y,
y =x =)y x
y x =)y x
Proof. (i)Deﬁne
D onRB by 
D 0 ()u  u 0 forallu inN. By(5), 
D agrees
with D on (B); hence we denote both orders by D. Let
H =f 2RB :bb =1g
and
hullH(x)=f0 2H : D 0 for some  2xg.
Then 0 = 2hullH(x), a closed convex set. Therefore, there exists a v in RB such that
sup
2hullH(x)
v  <v 0. (A.10)
Since b 2hullH(x), it follows that v b <v 0. This implies that v is not a constant.
Without loss of generality let vb =0, so that v 0 >0. It remains only to show that
vb 0 for all b 6=b. (A.11)
In that case, we can renormalize v to obtain u 2N satisfying (A.9).
To prove (A.11), given any b 6=b and <0, deﬁne

k b +(1 )b.
If <0, then  D 
 for all  2(B), and hence 











Since this holds for every <0, vb 0.
(ii) We have
x D hull(x) and y D hull(y).
By Worst,
x hull(x) and y hull(y). (A.12)
Thus it sufﬁces to show that
x =y =)hull(x)=hull(y).
Suppose that 0 2hull(x)nhull(y). Then by (i) there exists u in N such that
y(u)<0 u x(u), (A.13)
a contradiction. We conclude that hull(x)=hull(y).
Finally, let y  x on N. By (A.12), it is enough to show that hull(x)  hull(y).
Otherwise, there exists 0 2 hull(x) n hull(y), which implies (A.13), contradicting our
hypothesis. 382 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Deﬁne W :!R by
W(x)=W(x)for each x 2X.
Then W is well-deﬁned because, by Lemmas A.7–A.8 and IR,
x =x0 =)co(x) =co(x0) =)co(x)co(x0)=)
W(co(x))=W(co(x0))=)W(x)=W(x0).












Hence W satisﬁes the hypotheses of Corollary A.2, and so there exists a smallest convex












Finally, if (7) holds, then Preference Convexity implies
x x0 =)x +(1 )x0 x 8x,x0 2X82[0,1],
and so W is quasimonotone by Lemma A.1. By Corollary A.2,  is a singleton.
B. Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
B.1 Upper contour sets
Refer to the menu y as an upper contour set if
y =f 2(B):min
u2U
u  sg (B.1)
for some 0s 1 and some closed, convex and comprehensiveU N.
Proposition B.1. y is an upper contour set if and only if it satisﬁes Y1–Y3. Moreover, the
corresponding pair (U,s) is unique.
Thus
Y =fy 2X :y =f 2(B):min
u2U
u  sg, 0s 1,U 2K cc(N)g. (B.2)
Since K cc(N) is compact, it is straightforward to show that Y is compact (and hence
also measurable).24
We now turn to the proof of the proposition.
24In Lemma B.3, we prove the continuity ofU s 7 !f 2(B):minu2U u  sg.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 383
Lemma B.1. Let y satisfy Y1–Y3. If 0 2(B)ny, then there exists u 2N such that
u 0 <s u  for every  2y, (B.3)
where
s =minfp 2[0,1]:p 2yg. (B.4)
Proof. DeﬁnethepartialorderD on(B)asthesmallesttransitiverelationsatisfying
the condition that 0 D  if 0 is an elementary improvement of . Note that, for all
lotteries ,
b D  b for all  2(B), and (B.5)
[0 D , 2y]=)0 2y. (B.6)
As a result, fp 2[0,1]:p 2yg is nonempty because it contains 1 =b, and is closed
by Y1. Therefore, s is well-deﬁned and s 2y. Moreover, by Y3,
co(f0,sg)\y =fsg, (B.7)
where co(f0,sg)=f0 +(1 )s :2[0,1]g.
The deﬁnition of D admits the obvious extension to all of RB. Let
H =f 2RB :bb =1g
and
PhullH(y)=f 2H : 6=s, D 0 for some 0 2yg.
It follows from Y1 that PhullH(y) is convex. Deﬁne also
D0 =f 2H :0 D  for some 0 2co(f0,sg)g.
This set is also closed and convex, and it does not intersect PhullH(y): if  2 D0 \
PhullH(y), then there exists >0 and 0 in y such that
0 +(1 )s D  D 0.
Since D is transitive, 0 +(1 )s D 0 and 0 +(1 )s 2 y by (B.6). But this
contradicts (B.7).
Therefore, there exists a separating hyperplane v in RB such that
v 0 <v s v  for all  2PhullH(y), and (B.8)
v  v s for all  2D0. (B.9)
Since b 2PhullH(y), by (B.5), it follows that
v 0 <v b =vb.
Claim 1. vb vb for all b: Let vb >vb for some b, and consider 0 2H of the form
0
b = , 0
b =1+, and 0
b0 =0 for b0 6=b,b, where >0.384 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Then for any lottery , 0 D b D . Hence 0 D  and 0 2 PhullH(y). But v 0 =
vb +(vb  vb)<v 0 for sufﬁciently large , contradicting (B.8).
Claim 2. vb vb for all b: Let vb <vb for some b and consider  2H of the form
b = , b =1+, and b0 =0 for b0 6=b,b, where >0.
Then, using (B.5), 0 D b D , which implies 0 D . Hence  2 D0. However,
v  =(1+)vb  vb >v s for sufﬁciently large , contradicting (B.9).
Finally, normalize v to obtain u in N (ub = 0,ub = 1). Then u s = s and (B.3) is
satisﬁed. 
Proof of Proposition B.1. Weproveonlysufﬁciency. Deﬁnes by(B.4), sothat, by(10),
p 2y if and only if p s. (B.10)
Let
U =fu 2N :u  s 8 2yg.
ThenU is closed, convex, and comprehensive. We claim that s andU satisfy (B.1).
That y f 2(B):minu2U u  sg is immediate from the deﬁnition ofU. Thus it
remains to prove that
min
u2U
u  s =) 2y.
Suppose to the contrary that
min
u2U
u 0 s and 0 62y. (B.11)
Then by the lemma, there exists u 2N such that
u 0 <s u  for every  2y. (B.12)
Because s  u  for every  2 y, it follows that u 2 U. By (B.11), u 0  s. But this
contradicts (B.12).
We now turn to uniqueness. Suppose that
y =f 2(B):min
u2U
u  sg=f 2(B): min
u02U0u 0  s0g, (B.13)
where U and s are as above and where U0 is closed, convex, and comprehensive. That
s0 = s follows from (B.10). Evidently, U0 U. To prove equality, let u 2U nU0. Separate




 for all u 0 2U0.
Suppose that there exists 
2(B) satisfying the preceding (existence of such a 
 follows
fromaseparationargumentinRB andfromcomprehensivenessofU0). Then, bymixing

 suitably with b and b, it is without loss of generality to assume that u 
 < s < u 0 

for all u 0 2U0. But this is impossible: by (B.13), 
 2 y (using theU0-representation) and

62y (using theU-representation). Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 385
B.2 An intermediate result
In the sufﬁciency part of the proof, we use some results from Epstein and Seo (2007).
Theyprovearepresentationresultforpreferencesoverrandommenussatisfyingaxioms
that are collectively weaker than Order, Continuity, Nondegeneracy, and First-Stage In-
dependence, plus a form of Dominance whose formal statement is identical to the one
in this paper, but where the set Y of upper contour sets is required to satisfy a set of reg-
ularity conditions much weaker than Y1–Y3. (One qualiﬁcation is that Epstein and Seo
permitB 2Y,butthisisamatterofaharmlessdifferenceinnormalizations. Otherwise,
their conditions are trivial implications of (B.2).)




m(fy 2X :x \y 6=?g)dP(x) for all P 2(X), (B.14)
for some countably additive probability measure m 2 (X), viewed as a measure over
upper contour sets, such that m(Y)=1.25
Therationalefor(B.14)canbeunderstoodroughlyasfollows: Order,Continuity,and





for some continuous vNM index W :X ![0,1]. The normalizations
W(fbg)=0 and W(fbg)=1
can be shown to be without loss of generality given the remaining axioms. It is well-
known that, under suitable assumptions, a set function, such as W, can be expressed in
the form
W(x)=m(fy 2X :x \y 6=?g) 8x 2X (B.15)
for some unique countably additive probability measure on the Borel -algebra gener-
ated by the Hausdorff topology on X (see Choquet 1954, Theorems 50.1 and 51.1, as
well as the more recent works surveyed in Marinacci and Montrucchio 2004). The key
property of W that permits such a representation is that it is inﬁnitely alternating: for







25They prove also uniqueness of m, but we rely on Epstein and Seo (2007) only for the existence of m. In
order to be as self-contained as possible, the uniqueness property that we need here is proven below—see
Lemma B.6.386 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
One way to understand the representation result (B.14) in Epstein and Seo (2007) is that
it shows that the axioms for preference  adopted there imply that W is inﬁnitely alter-
nating.26
Finally, Dominance leads to the restriction m(Y) = 1 (thanks to a version of (B.15)
derived in Epstein and Seo 2007). This is because, as described in the text, Dominance
imposes ex ante certainty that only upper contour sets in Y will be relevant ex post.
We use (B.14), including the restriction m(Y)=1, heavily below where we derive the
further implications of Certainty Reversal of Order. We also use the following lemma
from Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 14.69).
Lemma B.2. The Borel -algebra on X coincides with the -algebra generated by the sets
of the form
fy 2X :x \y 6=?g for x 2X.
B.3 The remainder of the proof
Necessity: Only Dominance requires proof. The utility function W can be rewritten in
the form (B.14). (Such a representation is implied not only by the axioms, as noted






















(P0(fx :x \y 6=?g) P(fx :x \y 6=?g))dm(y),
which is non-negative if P0 dominates P.
The remainder of the proof establishes sufﬁciency of the axioms, and then the as-
serted uniqueness.






and deﬁne 	:K cc(N)[0,1]!Y by
	(U,s)=f :hU()sg. (B.18)
26Nehring (1996) was the ﬁrst to show a connection between an ordinal property analogous to Domi-
nance (that he calls Indirect Stochastic Dominance) and the cardinal property “inﬁnitely alternating.” He
derives a representation similar to (B.14) for his setting where menus consist of alternatives from the ﬁnite
set B rather than lotteries over B.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 387
Given D K cc(N), 	(D,[0,s]) is the image of D [0,s], that is,
	(D,[0,s])=f	(U,s0):U 2D,s0 2[0,s]g.
By Proposition B.1, 	 is one-to-one and onto.
Lemma B.3. For any Borel set D  K cc(N), 	(D,[0,s]) is a Borel-measurable subset of
X.
Proof. First observe that
(,U)7 !hU() is continuous. (B.19)
BytheMaximumTheorem,itsufﬁcestoshowthat(i)(,u)7 !u isjointlycontinuous,
and (ii) the correspondence  :B K cc(N) N deﬁned by
 (,U)=U
is continuous. Condition (i) is clear. For (ii), when viewed as a function from B 
K cc(N) into K cc(N),   is continuous under the Hausdorff metric. Therefore, (ii) fol-
lows from Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 14.16).
We claim that 	 is continuous. By Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 14.16), it
sufﬁces to show that 	 is a continuous correspondence.
To show that 	 is upper hemicontinuous, we let (Un,sn) ! (U,s) and n 2 	(Un,sn)
and prove that n has a limit point in 	(U,s). Since B is compact, there is a convergent
subsequence nk. Let nk ! . Then hUnk (nk)  snk for every k, which, by (B.19),
implies that hU()s.
We now show that 	 is lower hemicontinuous. Let (Un,sn) ! (U,s) and  2 	(U,s).





















and if hUn()=1, then
hUn(n)=hUn()=1sn.
Hence, n 2 	(Un,sn). And by (B.19), limn(1   hUn())  limn(1   sn), which implies
tn !1 and n !.388 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Finally, ﬁx s 2 [0,s] and let D be the set of measurable sets D such that 	(D,[0,s]) is
Borel measurable. Since 	 is one-to-one, D is easily seen to be a -algebra. Moreover,
whenD isclosed,itiscompactandhence,bycontinuityof	,	(D,[0,s])isalsocompact
and hence measurable. Thus D contains every closed set and thus also every Borel-
measurable set. 
Lemma B.4. Let m 2 (X) be the probability measure satisfying (B.14). Then Certainty
Reversal of Order implies that, for each measurable D K cc(N),
m(	(D,[0,s]))=s m(	(D,[0,1])).
Proof. Recall that m(Y) = 1. Therefore, by Proposition B.1, it sufﬁces to consider up-
per contour sets of the form y =f :hU()sg. For any such set y and 0t 1, deﬁne
t y =f :hU()tsg. For A Y and 0t 1, let
t A =ft y :y 2Ag.
Step 1. t fy 2Y :y \x 6=?g=fy 2Y :y \(tx +(1 t)fbg)6=?g
Proof. When t =0, both sets are empty. Let 0<t 1. It sufﬁces to show that
y 0 2Y and y 0 =t y for some y 2Y such that y \x 6=?
()[y 0 2Y and y 0 \(tx +(1 t)fbg)6=?].





u(t b  +(1 t)b)=t min
u2U
u b  ts.
Hence 0 2y 0. Also, t b  +(1 t)b 2tx +(1 t)fbg. Therefore, y 0\(tx +(1 t)fbg)6=?.
(=: Let y 0 2 Y and y 0 \(tx +(1 t)fbg) 6= ?. By the latter condition, there exists b  2 x
such that
0 =t b  +(1 t)b 2y 0.
Since y 0 2 Y, there exist U 2 K cc(N) and s 2 [0,1] such that y 0 = f : hU()  sg.





u (t b  +(1 t)b)=t min
u2U
u b  t.
Let y =f :hU()s=tg. Then
t y =f :min
u2U
u t (s=t)g=y 0.
Moreover, b  2y because
t min
u2U
u b  =min
u2U
u (t b  +(1 t)b)=min
u2U
u0 s.
Hence b  2x \y 6=?. This completes the step. ÃTheoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 389
Step 2. m(t fy 2Y :y \x 6=?g)=t m(fy 2Y :y \x 6=?g)
Proof. By Step 1, (B.14), and Certainty Reversal of Order,
m(t fy 2Y :y \x 6=?g)=m(fy 2Y :y \(tx +(1 t)fbg)6=?g)
=m(fy 2X :y \(tx +(1 t)fbg)6=?g)
=W(tx +(1 t)fbg)
=t W(x)=t m(fy 2Y :y \x 6=?g). Ã
Step 3. For any Borel set A Y, we have m(t A)=t m(A)
Proof. Let  be the collection of all Borel sets A  Y satisfying the noted condition. It
is easy to verify that  is a Dynkin system: (i) Y 2 ; (ii) if A,A0 2  and A  A0, then
A0 nA 2; (iii) if a sequence fAng in  is such that An %A, then A 2. The proofs are as
follows.
(i) m(t Y)=m(t fy 2Y :y \B 6=?g)=t m(fy 2Y :y \B 6=?g)=t m(Y), where
the second equality is by Step 2.
(ii) Since t (A0 nA)=(t A0)n(t A) and t A t A0,
m(t (A0 nA))=m(t A0) m(t A)
=t m(A0) t m(A)=t m(A0 nA).
(iii) m(t A)=limm(t An)=limt m(An)=t m(A).
Let F be the -system generated by sets of the form fy 2 Y : y \x 6= ?g. That is,
F is the smallest family of subsets such that F is closed under ﬁnite intersections and
fy 2Y :y \x 6=?g2F.
We show that F  . Let Fn = f\n
i=1fy 2 Y : y \xi 6= ?g :xi 2 Xg. It sufﬁces to show
that Fn  for all n 1. We argue by induction. By Step 2, F1 . We suppose Fn 
and show that Fn+1  . Let An = \n
i=1fy 2 Y : y \xi 6= ?g and An+1 = An \fy 2 Y :
y \xn+1 6=?g2Fn+1. Then
m(t An+1)=m(t An)+m(tfy 2Y :y \xn+1 6=?g)
 m[t (An [fy 2Y :y \xn+1 6=?g)].
The last term can be rewritten as
m[t ([\n
i=1fy 2Y :y \xi 6=?g][fy 2Y :y \xn+1 6=?g)]
=m[t (\n
i=1[fy 2Y :y \xi 6=?g[fy 2Y :y \xn+1 6=?g])]
=m[t (\n
i=1fy 2Y :y \(xi [xn+1)6=?g)]
=t m[\n
i=1fy 2Y :y \(xi [xn+1)6=?g] (by Fn )
=t m[(\n
i=1fy 2Y :y \xi 6=?g)[fy 2Y :y \xn+1 6=?g]
=t m[An [fy 2Y :y \xn+1 6=?g].390 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Thus
m(t An+1)=t m(An)+t m(fy 2Y :y \xn+1 6=?g) t m[An [fy 2Y :y \xn+1 6=?g]
=t m(An+1).
Hence F .
Therefore, by Dynkin’s Lemma (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 8.10),  in-
cludes the -algebra generated by F, which is the Borel -algebra (Lemma B.2). Ã
Finally, note that 	(D,[0,s]) = s  	(D,[0,1]) and 	(D,[0,1])  Y. Therefore, by
Lemma B.3 and Step 3, m(	(D,[0,s]))=s m(	(D,[0,1])). 
The desired representation will be established using the measure  2 (K cc(N))
deﬁned by
(D)=m(	(D,[0,1])) for each Borel set D K cc(N).







u d(U)dP(x) for each P 2(K (B)).
Proof. First we claim that, for any x 2K (B),27
f	(U,s):max
2x
hU()sg=fy 2Y :y \x 6=?g. (B.20)
: max2x hU()s =)9 2x, hU()s =)	(U,s)2fy 2Y :y \x 6=?g.
: If y 2 Y and y \x 6= ?, then y = 	(U,s) for some (U,s) 2 K cc(N)[0,1], and 9 2
	(U,s)\x. Then hU()  s. Thus max2x hU()  s and y = 	(U,s) 2 f	(U0,s0) :
max2x hU0()s0g.
SinceU 7!max2x minu2U u  is bounded and continuous, it is -integrable. Thus
there is a decreasing sequence of step functions n(U)=
Pn
i=1n,iIDn,i(U) such that n






























(the sets 	(Dn,i,[0,n,i]) are disjoint)


























m(fy 2Y :y \x 6=?g)dP(x)=W(P). 
It remains to prove the uniqueness assertion.
Lemma B.6. Givenany2(K cc(N))such thatpreference  is representedby theutility







Then there exists a unique Borel probability measure m on X such that
W(x)=m(fy :x \y 6=?g) 8x 2X. (B.22)392 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)




(fU :	(U,s)2 Bg)d(s), (B.23)
where  denotes the Lebesgue measure.
Proof. The set function W is inﬁnitely alternating, that is, it satisﬁes (B.16). More-
over, since  is countably additive, the Monotone Convergence Theorem implies that
W(xn)#W(x) whenever xn # x. Thus the existence of a unique measure m satisfying
(B.22) follows from Choquet (1954, Theorems 50.1, 51.1). (In fact, existence of m was
asserted in Section B.2 and was used in Lemma B.4—the new claim here is uniqueness.)
Foreachs 2[0,1],deﬁne	s :K cc(N)!Y by	s(U)=	(U,s). Asacorrespondence,
	s is compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous. By Aliprantis and Border (1994, The-
orem 14.11), it is a closed correspondence. Hence, by Aliprantis and Border (1994, The-
orem 14.68) it is measurable, and so by Aliprantis and Border (1994, Corollary 14.70),
when viewed as a function, 	s is Borel measurable, that is, 	 1
s (B) = fU : 	(U,s) 2 Bg is
Borel measurable for every measurable B X.
Therefore, s 7 !	 1
s (B) is well-deﬁned for each measurable B; it is also Lebesgue







By the Monotone Convergence Theorem, m0
 is easily seen to be a Borel measure. More-






















where e x = fy 2 Y : x \y 6= ?g. Therefore, by (B.22), m0
(e x) = m(e x) for all x 2 X. By
Lemma B.2 and the uniqueness property established in ﬁrst part of the proof, we con-
clude that m0
(B)=m(B) for all measurable B. 
Lemma B.7. Suppose that  and 0 represent the same preference as in (8). Then =0.
Proof. Deﬁne W and W 0 as in (B.21). Since both W and W 0 are vNM indices for ex-
pectedutilityfunctionsrepresenting,theymustbeidentical(givenalsothattheyagree
on fbg and fbg). Let m and m0 be the Borel probability measures on X correspond-
ing to  and 0 as in Lemma B.6. Then by Lemma B.6, m = m0. Therefore, for eachTheoretical Economics 2 (2007) Coarse contingencies and ambiguity 393










Aliprantis, Charalambos D. and Kim C. Border (1994), Inﬁnite Dimensional Analysis.
Springer, Berlin. [368, 386, 387, 390, 392]
Choquet, Gustave (1954), “Theory of capacities.” Annales de l’Institut Fourier, 5, 131–
295. [385, 392]
de Jonge, E. and A. C. M. van Rooij (1977), Introduction to Riesz spaces. Mathematisch
Centrum, Amsterdam. [375]
Dekel, Eddie, Barton L. Lipman, and Aldo Rustichini (2001), “Representing preferences
with a unique subjective state space.” Econometrica, 69, 891–934. [356]
Dempster, Arthur P . (1967), “Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multivalued
mapping.” Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 38, 325–339. [357]
Epstein, Larry G. and Martin Schneider (2003), “Recursive multiple-priors.” Journal of
Economic Theory, 113, 1–31. [359, 367]
Epstein, Larry G. and Kyoungwon Seo (2007), “Subjective states: a more robust model.”
Unpublished paper, Boston University. [366, 368, 385, 386, 392]
Ergin, Haluk and Todd Sarver (2005), “A unique costly contemplation representation.”
Unpublished paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [372, 377]
Ghirardato, Paolo (2001), “Coping with ignorance: Unforeseen contingencies and non-
additive uncertainty.” Economic Theory, 17, 247–276. [357, 371]
Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1989), “Maxmin expected utility with non-unique
prior.” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, 141–153. [357, 359, 363, 365]
Greenberg, Harvey J. and William P . Pierskalla (1971), “A review of quasi-convex func-
tions.” Operations Research, 19, 1553–1570. [372]
Herstein, I. N. and John Milnor (1953), “An axiomatic approach to measurable utility.”
Econometrica, 21, 291–297. [364]
Hörmander, Lars (1955), “Sur la fonction d’appui des ensembles convexes dans un es-
pace localement convexe.” Arkiv för Matematik, 3, 181–186. [379]
Kreps, DavidM.(1979), “Arepresentationtheoremfor‘preferenceforﬂexibility’.”Econo-
metrica, 47, 565–577. [356, 368]394 Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Kreps, David M. (1992), “Static choice in the presence of unforeseen contingencies.” In
Economic analysis of markets and games (Partha Dasgupta, Douglas Gale, Oliver Hart,
and Eric Maskin, eds.), 258–281, MIT Press, Cambridge. [356, 358]
Maccheroni, Fabio, Massimo Marinacci, and Aldo Rustichini (2006), “Ambiguity aver-
sion, robustness, and the variational representation of preferences.” Econometrica, 74,
1447–1498. [365, 372]
Machina, Mark J. (1984), “Temporal risk and the nature of induced preferences.” Journal
of Economic Theory, 33, 199–231. [361]
Marinacci,MassimoandLuigiMontrucchio(2004),“Introductiontothemathematicsof
ambiguity.” In Uncertainty in Economic Theory (Itzhak Gilboa, ed.), 46–107, Routledge,
London. [385]
Mukerji, Sujoy (1997), “Understanding the nonadditive probability decision model.”
Economic Theory, 9, 23–46. [357, 371, 372]
Nehring, Klaus (1996), “Preference for ﬂexibility and freedom of choice in a Savage
framework.” Working Paper, University of California, Davis. [358, 366, 368, 386]
Nehring, Klaus (1999), “Preference for ﬂexibility in a Savage framework.” Econometrica,
67, 101–119. [356, 358, 366, 368]
Phelps, Robert R. (1993), Convex Functions, Monotone Operators and Differentiability,
second edition, volume 1364 of Lecture Notes in Mathematics. Springer, Berlin. [377]
Schmeidler, David (1989), “Subjective probability and expected utility without additiv-
ity.” Econometrica, 57, 571–587. [357, 372]
Shafer, Glenn (1976), A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey. [357]
Submitted 2006-3-18. Final version accepted 2007-8-4. Available online 2007-8-30.